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Abstract 
 
he trustworthiness of analysts’ reports has rightly been questioned 
after the financial crises of the 1990s and 2000s revealed biases in 
their behaviour. This study investigated the inclination of analysts to 
issue overly-positive recommendations, the issuance patterns 
preferred by individual analysts, and the differential impact of 
recommendations between periods of positive and negative sentiment. 
The recommendation issuance preferences of 901 local and 
international analysts, who collectively issued 30 486 
recommendations for shares listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange from 1993 to 2011, were scrutinised. The investigation 
revealed that analysts issued their opinions using many different 
patterns within five possible recommendation categories, and showed 
signs of positive biases during all market cycles and investor sentiment 
periods. Surprisingly, analysts issued the same proportion of negative 
recommendations during periods of low business confidence and 
economic contraction than during phases of growth- and economic 
upswing. The BER Business Confidence Index outperformed the 
SARB’s business cycle indicator in demarcating periods where 
investors reacted stronger to recommendations issued by analysts. 
Investors are advised to study an analyst’s recommendation history in 
addition to current advice. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A variety of investors trust financial analysts to interpret potentially complex 
financial information and then to distribute the information and their associated 
conclusions. The level of reliance on analyst recommendations is often related to the 
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size and vocation of the investor; with smaller, non-professional investors having a 
tendency to over-rely on published recommendations (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 
2007). These smaller investors also generally trade more and benefit less from issued 
recommendations when compared to their larger counterparts; regularly generating 
an inferior level of return when responding to recommendation upgrades and buy 
recommendations (Mikhail, Walther & Willis, 2004). 
 
While a large body of research supports the notion that analyst recommendations can 
have a significant impact on prices and contain value for investors in both developed 
markets (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols & Trueman, 
2001; Boni & Womack, 2006) and in emerging markets (Moshirian, Ng & Wu, 2009; 
Gerritsen & Lötter, 2014), analysts are not always influential (Loh & Stulz, 2011) 
and some analysts have a greater impact on prices than others (Fang & Yasuda, 
2014). Investors therefore cannot expect all analysts to always give profitable advice 
and need to find a way of deciding which analysts to trust because they are not 
equally skilled (Welch, 2000).  
 
Aside from variations in skill, one behavioural phenomenon in particular is often 
associated with analysts in the wider body of literature: a positive bias (Diefenbach, 
1972; Stickel, 1995; Barber et al., 2001; Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 2006). Analysts 
who are overly positive, for instance, will issue buy recommendations instead of 
holds, and hold recommendations instead of sells. A positively-biased 
recommendation is therefore roughly defined in this study as a recommendation that 
should have been of a lower recommendation category. 
 
The purpose of this article was to first identify whether analysts issuing 
recommendations for shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
demonstrated a general tendency to be overly positive. The overall recommendation 
tendencies during periods of positive and negative sentiment were also investigated 
and the recommendation patterns amongst analysts were identified. Lastly, the 
abnormal impact of recommendations during (i) periods of high and low business 
confidence and (ii) expanding or contracting economic cycles was compared to 
investigate if investor sentiment was aligned with the impact of recommendations. 
 
The remainder of this paper presents literature contextualising the individual 
analysts’ recommendations relative to the factors that may influence their decision 
making processes. The methodology section describes the research process applied 
to measure the various analysts’ recommendation reporting preferences and their 
impact on share prices. The results and discussions are presented and the study 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results for investors relying on 
analyst recommendations.  
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2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Recommendations that impacted specific companies 
 
While not all analyst recommendations are associated with significant abnormal 
returns (Stickel, 1995; Mikhail et al., 2004), the impact of recommendations can be 
considerable. For instance, during 2007 Kenneth Bruce reported to Merrill Lynch 
regarding a leading mortgage lender’s ability to continue doing business during the 
credit crisis. The report caused a 13 per cent fall in the share price on the day the 
report was issued. Another example was Meredith Whitney’s downgrade of 
Citigroup, after which a fall of 6,9 per cent in the share price, the CEO’s resignation, 
and even death threats against her followed (Loh & Stulz, 2011). In both cases the 
analyst’s opinion was respected by market participants. Loh and Stulz suggested that 
significant abnormal returns following a recommendation revision revealed the 
analyst’s ability to occasionally change the perception of a company, and bring forth 
a ‘paradigm shift’. When a single analyst changes the consensus opinion by issuing 
an influential recommendation, the ‘paradigm shift’ normally initiates other analyst 
recommendation revisions and traded volume increases. 
 
The fall of Enron at the end of 2001 demonstrated another element of analyst 
behaviour. Two months before Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, 
seventeen analysts were actively covering the company. Of the seventeen analysts, 
ten issued strong buy recommendations, while another five issued buy 
recommendations. What makes this noteworthy is that these favourable 
recommendations were published during the period where a 50 per cent loss in 
market capitalisation occurred and large accounting losses were reported for Enron 
(Clarke et al., 2006). The positively biased analysts subsequently encouraged doubt 
amongst investors concerning analysts’ credibility when investors became aware that 
analysts had negative information without adjusting their recommendations 
accordingly. The question remains as to what influences analysts to change their 
recommendations? 
 
2.2 Factors influencing analysts’ opinions 
 
Analysts are reported to react to both financial and non-financial information, or 
alternatively to both qualitative and quantitative information. Upcoming mergers and 
the release of annual financial data were identified as financial trigger events leading 
to recommendation revisions. That said, non-financial information is reported to 
often be of greater importance to sell-side analysts. Analysts were found to revise 
recommendations and change earnings forecasts after management teams released 
official statements, after adjustments in the strategic positioning of companies are 
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made and after news affecting a company’s operating environment is released (Kerl 
et al., 2012).  
 
Further evidence suggests that the size and market share of a company, a company’s 
product offering and the business environment that the company is competing in are 
taken into account when analysts issue recommendations (Previts et al., 1994). On 
the other hand, analysts have also been noted to have the ability to be side-tracked 
because of paying too much attention to macro factors and neglecting a company’s 
specific information (Peng & Xiong, 2006). Bradshaw (2002) found that analysts 
often justify negative recommendations by stating qualitative information, while 
positive recommendations are frequently based on more pragmatic valuations. 
 
The relationship between the analysts and company management can also affect the 
views of analysts. Irvine (2001; 2004) noted that the types of information content 
released by analysts are influenced by the trading commissions they might receive 
from increased traded volumes. Furthermore, analysts are often provided with 
information by the management personnel of companies, and this close relationship 
can have an effect on the informational content of analyst publications. Clarke et al. 
(2006) noted that the analysts are often employed by investment banks that might 
own the shares within the coverage of the analyst. This scenario clearly puts the 
analysts in a position to favourably affect the banks’ portfolios, creating a situation 
where “analysts are reluctant to issue negative recommendations because of the 
potential loss of future investment banking deals” (Clarke et al., 2006:2). 
 
2.3 The reaction of market participants to new information 
 
After new information or recommendations are released by analysts, individual and 
institutional investors have to interpret the information and physically trade shares in 
order to change a share’s price. Prices normally fluctuate after information reaches 
investors, because investors have non-uniform ways of interpreting information and 
a variety of processes and incentives to act upon the information according to the 
‘differences of opinion’ theory (Harris & Raviv, 1993). The differences in investors’ 
decision-making models are a double-edged sword: it creates the much needed 
liquidity offered by counterparties who buy (sell) when others are selling (buying), 
but may also cause severe short-term price fluctuations, wrongful over- and under-
pricing of assets, and market-‘bubbles’ (Shefrin, 2000). Investors’ sentiment, the 
type of information, and how the information reaches investors, also play a role in 
the effect that information has on prices.  
 
Savor (2012) investigated the effect of information-based price movements versus 
price movements not associated with analyst reports or new financial data. Savor 
concluded that strong price movements that do not coincide with at least one credible 
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analyst report to support the price change had strong price reversals, while price 
events accompanied by sufficient supporting information were normally followed by 
sustained price momentum. An analyst’s report or various analysts’ reports had to be 
aligned with the direction of the price change; otherwise a strong price reversal had 
a high probability of occurring. Loh and Stulz’s (2011) US study revealed that more 
than one third of all recommendations issued did not result in the advised price-
change direction or ‘sign’, meaning a plus or minus to positive and negative 
recommendations respectively. 
 
Any single analyst will naturally have difficulty issuing recommendations for all the 
listed shares. The consequence is specialisation and focus on certain industries or 
companies. Boni and Womack (2006) implemented an industry-centred research 
methodology for the 1996 to 2001 time period, and found that 53 out of 59 industries 
yielded significant one-month abnormal returns when shorting sell-recommended 
shares and purchasing buy-recommended shares. Boni and Womack (2006:1) also 
found that recommendation changes for shares covered by many analysts yielded 
substantially less returns than shares followed by fewer analysts. The conclusion 
reached was that “competition among analysts reduces the opportunity to profit”. 
Analysts who can operate in a niche environment covering a lesser-known industry 
or small shares might have an advantage over analysts who cover well-known or 
favoured shares.  
 
2.4 Positive bias and impact 
 
Analysts have often been reported to issue overly-positive recommendations 
(Diefenbach, 1972; Stickel, 1995; Barber et al., 2001) to increase investors’ trade 
activities (Prayag & Van Rensburg, 2006:7) or protect their affiliations (Kadan, 
Madureira, Wang & Zach, 2009). Some analysts with many retail clients have even 
been demonstrated to be overly positive more often than analysts employed by 
institutional clients (Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 2006). 
 
Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) researched the distribution of buy, hold and sell 
recommendations and the impact of recommendations. They considered the March 
2000 to April 2003 period and grouped 5 282 consensus recommendations into 
month-end buy, hold and sell portfolios. The percentage of buys and holds were 
38 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. The percentage of sell recommendations 
was only three per cent (consistent with Bidwell, 1977; Elton, Gruber & Grossman, 
1986; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Hall & Millard, 2002).  
 
Analysts who work at brokerages that mainly issue recommendations to retail clients 
are commonly more positive than those working at companies who do research for 
institutional and larger corporate clients (Cowen et al., 2006). Again, the fee- and 
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incentivisation structures were found to play a significant role in the degree of 
analyst-positivity portrayed through the recommendations and reports they issued.  
 
Although the general impact of analyst recommendations for JSE-listed shares was 
confirmed by Hall and Millard (2002), Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) and 
Gerritsen and Lötter (2014), none of these studies provide in-depth details concerning 
the behavioural differences among the individual analysts in the way they issue 
recommendations, except for claims concerning an overall positive bias stemming 
from a judgement on non-parametric proportional data.  
 
3 Overview  
 
Previous studies on the impact of analyst recommendations in South Africa have only 
yielded insight into the respective overall sample’s distribution of buy, hold and sell 
recommendations, the impact of consensus recommendation levels and the average 
impact of recommendations over specific time periods. There is therefore an 
opportunity to further research analysts’ issuance patterns and possible biases among 
analysts collectively and individually. The literature review further showed that 
analyst recommendations can generate abnormal returns, but that the impact of the 
various analysts’ recommendations was not equal for all analysts and sectors 
covered. The analysts’ behaviour is suggested to be influenced by their relationships 
and affiliations, in turn causing a positive bias. The research questions flowing from 
the literature are formulated as propositions and hypotheses in the methodology 
section to follow. 
 
4 Data and methodology 
 
The Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimates System (I/B/E/S), which lists 
recommendations on a day-to-day basis, was used as the primary source of 
recommendations for this study, and the data was analysed using Microsoft Excel 
and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). Recommendations for JSE listed shares 
were first captured in I/B/E/S from 1993, and this paper analyses the 30 486 
recommendation initiations and revisions that were issued from 1993 to 2011. The 
number of active equity analysts and brokerage houses amounted to 901 and 105 
respectively over the sample period. I/B/E/S used a five-point scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’, 
where ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’ and ‘5’ respectively represents a strong buy, a buy, a hold, a 
sell and a strong sell.  
 
In this section the hypotheses and propositions identified from the existing literature 
are listed, followed by a brief description of the test(s) related to the specific 
hypothesis or proposition. 
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Hypothesis 1: Analysts prefer to rather issue hold recommendations than 
strong sell- or sell recommendations. 
 
Descriptive statistics per calendar year for 1993 to 2011 were calculated to measure 
the distribution of analyst recommendations and the recommendation preferences of 
the analysts over time. The number of instances for each of the five-point 
recommendation categories was calculated over the full period and per calendar year 
to prepare the data for tests that aimed to determine if a tendency existed among 
analysts to be overly-positive. The results were then presented as percentages of total 
recommendations per year (e.g. 25 per cent strong sells) to determine if issuance 
patterns persisted over time and through different market cycles. Correlations were 
calculated using these proportional annual percentages to measure the analysts’ 
preference for migrating between recommendation categories. 
 
The recommendation categories were collapsed and grouped as buys, holds and sells; 
and the percentage of total recommendations of each grouping calculated per 
calendar year. The correlations between buys and sells, buys and holds, and hold and 
sells were calculated over various control periods: over the total period, years where 
buys decreased, years where sells decreased, years where buys increased, and lastly, 
years where sells increased. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Analysts issue more strong sell- and sell recommendations 
during times of negative sentiment or economic contraction than during times 
of positive sentiment or economic expansion. 
 
The proportional percentage of total recommendations for each of the five 
recommendation categories were calculated and allocated to periods of general 
‘business confidence’ (economic expansion) and ‘lack of confidence’ (economic 
contraction) to measure if a possible general positive bias persisted among analysts 
over these periods. The Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) and Bureau for Economic 
Research’s (BER) Business Confidence Index (BCI) was used as an indication of the 
periods where sentiment was positive or negative (BER, 2014), while the Business 
cycle phases of South Africa report by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was 
used to indicate the business cycle phase that the listed companies found themselves 
in (SARB, 2014). 
 
The BCI takes the ‘business confidence’ of respondents from the retail-,  wholesale-
, motor trade-, manufacturing-, building- and construction sectors into account and 
measures business confidence at the end of every quarter. The BCI is regarded as a 
leading indicator of the economic business cycle phases because sentiment is 
expected to change before it is reflected in the various sectors’ reported performance 
numbers. The RMB/BER’s BCI is therefore an suitable indicator of sentiment for the 
majority of companies the analysts issued recommendations for, and the sentiment 
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reflected by the level of the BCI is expected to coincide with sentiment changes 
among analysts.  
 
The BCI can range from zero to 100, with a level above 55 normally viewed as 
positive sentiment and a level below 45 viewed as negative sentiment (Kershof, 
2000). For the purposes of this study, a BCI level above 60 (below 40) was used as 
an indication of positive sentiment (negative sentiment) to assure a strong indication 
of general sentiment. The start- and end dates of the business sentiment and economic 
growth phases, as applicable to the 1993 to 2011 sample period used in this study, 
are shown in Table 1 Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
 
Table 1: Turning points signalling economic sentiment and growth phases 
(1993-2011) 
 
Panel A: BCI turning points signalling economic sentiment 
Negative sentiment (BCI < 40)  Positive sentiment (BCI > 60) 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
1993/11/01 1994/03/31 150  1994/10/01 1995/06/30 272 
1996/07/01 1996/09/30 91  1995/10/01 1995/12/31 91 
1997/04/01 1999/12/31 1 004  2002/04/01 2002/12/31 274 
2000/04/01 2001/09/30 547  2003/10/01 2007/12/31 1 552 
2008/07/01 2009/12/31 548     
2010/04/01 2010/06/30 90     
2011/07/01 2011/12/31 183     
 
Panel B: Economic turning points signalling contraction or expansion 
Economic contraction  Economic expansion 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
    1993/06/01 1996/11/30 1 125 
1996/12/01 1999/08/31 1 003  1999/09/01 2007/11/31 3 012 
2007/12/01 2009/08/31 639  2009/09/01 2011/12/31 851 
Source: Adapted from BER, 2014 and SARB, 2014 
 
The total number of recommendations and the number of recommendations per 
recommendation category were counted for each positive and negative sentiment 
period and for the total period. The percentage incidence of each recommendation 
category was then calculated within the relevant sentiment’s timeframe. The results 
were further summarised by grouping strong buys and buys together under ‘Buys’, 
and sells and strong sells under ‘Sells’. The minimum, maximum and weighted 
average of each recommendation category’s percentage incidence per sentiment-
period were lastly calculated for the positive and negative periods respectively in 
order to measure if analysts communicated an overly-positive sentiment. The z-test 
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for proportions was applied to measure if the various recommendation categories’ 
incidence changed significantly. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Analysts do not issue recommendations according to uniform 
patterns. 
 
The prevalence of analysts’ recommendation patterns and preferences were 
identified and measured. The number of analysts who issued recommendations per 
recommendation pattern, the instances of recommendations per recommendation 
category and the average analyst activity per pattern were calculated. The results 
were then ranked according to average analyst activity per pattern to find the patterns 
with the most active analysts. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Buys (sells) had a greater impact during positive (negative) 
sentiment periods than during negative (positive) sentiment periods. 
 
Firstly, the Thomson Reuters Datastream total return share price indices from were 
used to calculate returns including the effect of dividends for individual shares. Both 
Datastream and I/B/E/S hold delisted share’s data, making the study free of any 
survivorship bias. The average number of shares covered by analysts was below 150 
before 1996 whereafter it increased to 340 in 1999. In the years thereafter the 
coverage fluctuated between 150 and 200 shares untill 2011.  
 
The short-term market-adjusted return (MAR) and the Fama-French three-factor 
(Fama & French, 1992) risk-adjusted return (RAR) impact of each individual 
analyst’s recommendations were calculated as recommended by Gerritsen and Lötter 
(2014) for the day of and the day after each recommendation was issued. The 
abnormal returns (ARs) for MAR and RAR on both day t and day t+1 were 
winsorised at their respective first and 99th percentiles to limit the effect of outliers 
on the results. After winsorisation the MAR and RAR on day t and day t+1 all fell 
within the -8,7 per cent to 8,8 per cent range. The term ‘impact’ is used throughout 
to describe the abnormal return following recommendations. 
 
The short term impact of the recommendations was used in an attempt to isolate the 
recommendation and coinciding related information flows from ‘noise’ that might 
influence investors over time. For each recommendation category, the negative 
sentiment period’s average MAR and average RAR were subtracted from the positive 
sentiment period’s respective average MAR and RAR for day t and day t+1. The 
statistical significance of the differences was tested with a one-sided t-test for 
unequal samples with unequal variances. This test was suitable because the sample 
sizes were large enough for the central limit theorem to hold throughout, especially 
after the winsorisation reduced the length of each ARs’ distribution’s tails. 
 
 
10 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Results and discussion 
 
The results of the analysis of JSE focused equity analysts’ recommendation issuance 
patterns and the impact of their recommendations on the JSE-listed shares are 
presented and discussed. The distribution of all recommendations per calendar year 
is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of recommendations 
 
The overall 1993 to 2011 distribution among each year’s proportion of strong buy-, 
buy-, hold-, sell- and strong sell recommendations were 24,6 per cent, 19,5 per cent, 
37,4 per cent, 10,6 per cent and 7,8 per cent respectively. When differentiating 
between positive and negative recommendations, the sample consisted of 44,2 per 
cent positive recommendations versus only 18,4 per cent sell and strong sell 
recommendations on average.  
 
Analysts migrated between strong buy- and buy recommendations over the period, 
producing a clear inverse movement between the two recommendation categories in 
Figure 1. The correlation between the strong buy category’s annual percentage 
incidence and buy category’s annual percentage incidence was significant at -
0,84***, showing that the active groups of analysts issued recommendations in one 
of the two categories but not both, also indicative of ‘herding’ among the analysts 
(Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010). 
 
Positive recommendations reached a level of 32,1 per cent during 2005, i.e. 10,3 per 
cent below their average proportion. The decrease in positive recommendations did 
not have the expected inverse effect on negative recommendations, but rather an 
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increase in hold recommendations. Negative recommendations only peaked at 
24,4 per cent during 2010, five years after the low-point for positive 
recommendations. The subsequent eight per cent fall in negative recommendations 
to 16,3 per cent during 2011 coincided with a five per cent rise in positive 
recommendations. The correlation analysis indicating the analysts’ preferred 
recommendation categories to migrate to during different market cycles is presented 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Correlation between recommendation category increases and 
decreases per calendar year 
 
Control period (Scenario) n Buys vs. Sells Buys vs. Holds Holds vs. Sells 
Total period 18 
-0,66*** 
(-2,97) 
-0,81*** 
(-5,56) 
0,09 
(-0,36) 
(a) Decrease in Buys 9 
-0,78*** 
(-5,00) 
-0,93*** 
(-9,90) 
0,49** 
(2,25) 
(b) Decrease in Sells 7 
-0,78*** 
(-5,06) 
-0,95*** 
(-12,15) 
0,55*** 
(2,65) 
(c) Increase in Buys 9 
-0,58*** 
(-2,82) 
-0,73*** 
(-4,26) 
-0,14 
(-0,57) 
(d) Increase in Sells 11 
-0,71*** 
(-4,00) 
-0,81*** 
(-5,61) 
0,17 
(0,67) 
Note: Correlations indicated with asterisks are significantly different from zero for a two-tailed test. 
 
For the total period, the -0,81 and -0,66 correlations indicated that analysts 
predominantly fluctuated between positive and hold recommendation categories and 
between positive and negative recommendation categories, while the tendency to 
move between sells and holds was not statistically significant and directionless with 
a correlation of 0,09. The years where all buys or all sells increased (scenarios c and 
d) also had no correlated movement between hold and sell proportions. 
 
When comparing the years when buys decreased (a) to the years where sells 
decreased (b), the migration towards hold recommendations from the non-controlled 
recommendation category was different for the two scenarios with statistically 
significant correlations of 0,49 and -0,95 respectively. This results from (a) and (b) 
confirm that analysts grouped hold recommendations with sell recommendations, 
possibly supporting the premise that hold recommendations may be used by analysts 
to ‘cloak’ or hide negative opinions at times. In other words, this phenomenon might 
have been produced by analysts who issued hold recommendations rather than sells 
during periods of negative sentiment.  
 
While scenarios (a) and (b) produced a statistically significant relationship between 
the hold and sell categories, holds and sell did not have a significant correlation in 
(c) and (d) where the controlled recommendation category increased. This might 
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have occurred due to strong sentiment from analysts during periods where they 
increased their issuances of the control variable. 
 
When comparing years where buys increased (c) or decreased (a), hold 
recommendations showed a stronger negative correlation with buys than with sells 
did in both scenarios. This result further shows analysts’ preference to move to hold 
than to sells because the two non-controlled recommendation categories should rise 
and fall in tandem if holds and sells were equally likely as a category. This evidence 
supports Proposition 1’s notion that analysts prefer to issue hold recommendations 
rather than sell recommendations.  
 
The incidence percentages of the various recommendation categories over different 
positive and negative business confidence periods and economic growth-phases are 
displayed in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. 
 
Table 3: Sentiment of analysts vs. business confidence 
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Table 4: Sentiment of analysts vs. economic cycles 
 
 
 
A few patterns emerge when comparing Table 3 and Table 4. The individual SARB 
business cycle periods lasted much longer on average than the sentiment indicator’s 
individual periods. Furthermore, strong buys occurred more frequently than buys 
before 2002 irrespective of the sentiment- or economic growth cycle direction, while 
analysts issued more buys than strong buys from 2002 onwards. Strong sells also 
generally occurred more often before 1997 than after 1997. The hold category was 
fairly stable over all of the event windows in the two tables, and was six per cent to 
seven per cent more on average during economic expansion and positive sentiment 
than during negative cycles. The proportion of all sells was between 18 and 19 per 
cent in every table, which is markedly higher than the three per cent reported by 
Prayag and van Rensburg (2006). 
 
The buys, holds and sells summary categories’ averages during the economic 
contraction and negative sentiment periods further only differed by 0,8 per cent, 
1,2 per cent and -0,4 per cent respectively, indicating a very similar recommendation 
pattern among analysts for all categories during negative cycles. Conversely, the 
summary categories’ averages during the economic expansion and positive sentiment 
periods differed by 3,1 per cent, 2,5 per cent and 0,5 per cent respectively, indicating 
a very similar recommendation pattern only for the sells category. Figure 2 offers a 
visual depiction of the aforementioned relationship. 
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Figure 2: Average buys, holds and sells across sentiment- and economic growth 
cycles 
 
The number of sells issued by analysts during negative periods overlaps for all four 
data points in Figure 3.2, while the expectation would have been that percentage sells 
during ‘BCI < 40’ and ‘SARB - contraction’ would be higher than during ‘BCI > 60’ 
and ‘SARB - expansion’ respectively. The analysts therefore did not issue more 
negative recommendations during negative cycles. Another unexpected result shown 
visually is that the percentage buys was less than the percentage holds during positive 
BCI cycles. One possible explanation could be that the analysts started issuing 
positive (negative) recommendations before the end of the negative cycles (positive 
cycles) in anticipation of what was to come; while another reason could have been 
that the measurement of the cycles by the SARB and the BER respectively lagged 
the actual cycles experienced by the individual listed shares that received 
recommendations. The results of the statistical significance tests of the differences 
between the negative and positive cycles are displayed in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Change in category incidence: negative cycles to positive cycles 
 
 Buys Holds Sells 
Positive sentiment % minus negative  
sentiment % 
-7,9%*** 
(-11,07) 
7,1%*** 
(10,23) 
0,7% 
(1,26) 
Expansion % minus contraction  
-5,6%*** 
(-9,59) 
5,8%*** 
(10,19) 
-0,2% 
(-0,44) 
Note: The test-statistic value for the z-test for proportions is indicated in brackets. Differences indicated with 
asterisks are statistically significant in a two-tailed test of whether the proportions differed significantly among 
the various periods (P1≠P2). 
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The analysts’ recommendation issuance patterns for buys and holds changed 
significantly over both sentiment and economic cycle tests. The unexpected 0.7 per 
cent higher incidence of sell recommendations during positive sentiment periods than 
during negative periods was not statistically significant, while the incidence of sells 
during both economic contraction and expansion periods was also not statistically 
significantly different from each other. Analysts are therefore judged to have been 
overly positive during periods of low business confidence and economic 
contractions, and exhibited a positive bias. This result leads to the conclusion that the 
null hypothesis of Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected, and that analysts did not issue 
more strong sell- and sell recommendations during times of negative sentiment and 
economic contraction than during times of positive sentiment and economic 
expansion. This finding strongly supports the notion of a positive bias among 
analysts. 
 
Now that the overall migration of analysts’ collective recommendation preferences 
has been investigated, the individual analysts’ recommendation issuance patterns 
will be analysed. The top 15 preferred recommendation categories and pattern 
distribution of analysts are indicated in Table 6. 
 
The two most common recommendation patterns are ranked first and sixth (13,5 per 
cent and 15,5 per cent respectively), indicating that almost a third of analysts either 
issued recommendations throughout the five-point scale or chose to only issue buy-, 
hold- and sell recommendations. Although analysts only issuing buy-, hold- and sell 
recommendations are the most prevalent, analysts issuing recommendations from 
strong buy through to strong sell were the most active over the sample period. Signs 
of a positive bias are evident throughout Table 6. Analysts who never issued buy- 
and strong buy recommendations comprised 13,2 per cent of the sample, while 
38,6 per cent never issued a sell- and strong sell recommendation. The second most 
active group of analysts only issued strong buy- to sell recommendations, choosing 
to not issue strong sell recommendations at all and only issue negative sell 
recommendations 11,9 per cent of the time.  
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Table 6: Top-15 recommendation pattern activity distributions (1993-2011) 
 
 
Strong 
buy 
Buy Hold Sell Strong 
sell 
Average of 
analysts' 
total 
activity 
Proportion 
of analysts 
following 
pattern 
R
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
 p
a
tt
er
n
s 
4 835 
(28,2%) 
2 965 
(17,3%) 
5 955 
(34,7%) 
1 853 
(10,8%) 
1 557 
(9,1%) 
133 13,5% 
384 
(18,2%) 
673 
(31,9%) 
800 
(38%) 
251 
(11,9%)  
47 4,7% 
 
125 
(31,8%) 
179 
(45,5%) 
71 
(18,1%) 
18 
(4,6%) 
44 0,9% 
671 
(34,3%) 
292 
(14,9%) 
763 
(39%)  
228 
(11,7%) 
41 5,0% 
827 
(38,4%)  
917 
(42,6%)  
407 
(18,9%) 
28 8,1% 
 
1 397 
(35,6%) 
1707 
(43,5%) 
817 
(20,8%)  
27 15,5% 
128 
(37,4%)  
159 
(46,5%) 
55 
(16,1%)  
19 1,9% 
 
67 
(48,2%) 
44 
(31,7%)  
28 
(20,1%) 
12 1,3% 
73 
(30,9%) 
75 
(31,8%) 
88 
(37,3%)   
11 2,3% 
50 
(64,9%)    
27 
(35,1%) 
9 0,9% 
9 
(69,2%)   
4 
(30,8%)  
7 0,2% 
 
244 
(50,1%) 
243 
(49,9%)   
6 8,4% 
143 
(50,5%)  
140 
(49,5%)   
5 5,8% 
  
9 
(36%) 
10 
(40%) 
6 
(24%) 
5 0,5% 
  
57 
(53,3%) 
50 
(46,7%)  
5 2,3% 
 
The number of instances per recommendation category is presented; and the 
percentage occurrence within the pattern displayed in brackets. The list is sorted 
according to the ‘average analyst activity’ among individual analysts who issued 
recommendations according to the pattern. ‘Average analyst activity’ is the mean 
number of recommendations per analyst per recommendation pattern. The 
percentage of analysts who only issued recommendations under a certain pattern is 
indicated under “Proportion of analysts following pattern”. 
 
The third most active analyst group only issued buy- through to strong sell 
recommendations. Although this group contains two negative recommendation 
categories and only one positive recommendation category, only 22.7 per cent of this 
recommendation pattern was negative recommendations, again supporting the notion 
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of negative-recommendation aversion among the analysts. All the aforementioned 
results support the notion in Proposition 3 that analysts did not issue 
recommendations according to uniform patterns. 
 
Analysts who are positively biased would therefore be expected to rather issue a hold 
recommendation than a negative recommendation. The abnormal return for hold 
recommendations should therefore be expected to be slightly negative if the group 
contains both true hold recommendations and concealed negative opinions.  
 
The two positive and negative periods’ abnormal return differentials on the day of 
and the day after the recommendations for the 1993 tot 2011 period are indicated in 
Tables 7 and 8. In both tables the negative sentiment period’s returns are subtracted 
from the positive period’s returns to measure if investors reacted more positively or 
negatively during certain periods than in others. 
 
Table 7: BCI positive minus negative sentiment average abnormal return 
impact  
 
  Recommendation 
Abnormal 
return: 
 Strong buy Buy Hold Sell 
Strong 
sell 
Market-
adjusted 
Day t 
0,14%** 
(1,734) 
0,21%*** 
(2,94) 
-0,02% 
(-0,373) 
-0,03% 
(-0,249) 
-0,10% 
(-0,804) 
Day t+1 
0,09% 
(1,233) 
0,19%*** 
(2,533) 
0,02% 
(0,302) 
0,05% 
(0,421) 
-0,29%*** 
(-2,408) 
Count 
919 vs, 
 4 998 
1 666 vs, 
 2 579 
2 794 vs, 
 5 623 
762 vs, 
1 636 
471 vs, 
1 263 
Risk-
adjusted 
Day t 
0,10%* 
(1,282) 
0,09% 
(1,248) 
-0,03% 
(-0,49) 
-0,02% 
(-0,228) 
-0,08% 
(-0,681) 
Day t+1 
-0,02% 
(-0,21) 
0,12%* 
(1,61) 
-0,02% 
(-0,405) 
-0,01% 
(-0,082) 
-0,28%** 
(-2,300) 
Count 
884 vs,  
4 839 
1624 vs,  
2 489 
2710 vs,  
5 468 
742 vs,  
1 601 
459 vs,  
1 241 
Note: Abnormal returns indicated with asterisks are significant in a one-tailed test of whether the mean 
abnormal return difference is significantly different from zero. 
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Table 8: Expansion minus contraction average abnormal return impact  
 
  Recommendation 
Abnormal 
return: 
 
Strong 
buy 
Buy Hold Sell 
Strong 
sell 
Market-
adjusted 
Day t 
0,06% 
(0,876) 
0,03% 
(0,386) 
-0,03% 
(-0,499) 
-0,18%* 
(-1,68) 
-0,02% 
(-0,212) 
Day 
t+1 
0,05% 
(0,776) 
0,01% 
(0,098) 
-0,03% 
(-0,535) 
-0,15%* 
(-1,405) 
-0,14%* 
(-1,290) 
Count 
3 647 vs,  
3 726 
4 007 vs,  
1 806 
7 195 vs,  
3 911 
1 993 vs,  
1 086 
1 288 vs, 
 1 014 
Risk-adjusted 
Day t 
0,09%* 
(1,335) 
-0,05% 
(-0,648) 
-0,01% 
(-0,212) 
-0,02% 
(-0,186) 
-0,02% 
(-0,164) 
Day 
t+1 
0,04% 
(0,616) 
-0,03% 
(-0,456) 
-0,04% 
(-0,806) 
-0,17%* 
(-1,585) 
-0,12% 
(-1,157) 
Count 
3 512 vs,  
3 598 
3 878 vs,  
1 738 
6 975 vs,  
3 800 
1 940 vs,  
1 065 
1 253 vs,  
997 
Note: Abnormal returns indicated with asterisks are significant in a one-tailed test of whether the mean 
abnormal return difference is significantly different from zero. 
 
The results in Table 7 contains five instances of strong statistically significant 
differences in investor’s reaction to analysts’ recommendations, with  both buy 
categories and strong sells showing a marked difference in the average impact of 
recommendations when comparing periods of high and low business confidence. 
Strong buys reacted stronger on the day the recommendation was issued, strong sells 
performed better the day after the recommendation was issued during low confidence 
periods, and buys performed much stronger on both days when adjusted for the 
market.  
 
The results in Table 8 are weakly significant at the 10% level at best. Of all the 
recommendation categories, sell recommendations performed the best during 
economic contractions when compared to performance during economic expansions. 
Although not statistically significant, the other results in Table 8 do have the correct 
expected sign with buys doing better on average during expansions, and holds and 
sells having a greater average impact during contractions.  
 
When comparing Tables 7 and 8, the demarcation of investor sentiment and their 
subsequent reaction to recommendations fared much better when using the BER’s 
BCI than when relying on the SARB’s economic cycle indicators. The null 
hypothesis of Hypothesis 4 can therefore be rejected only when using the BCI, 
indicating that the impact of recommendations increased when aligned with the 
prevailing sentiment in the market. The use of the SARB’s economic cycle index is 
therefore not advised when trying to match investor sentiment to the sentiment of 
analysts. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This study investigated the proposition of previous studies that analysts issuing 
recommendations on JSE-listed shares may be overly positive in their reported 
opinions, and continued to research the patterns of issuance preferences among 
analysts as well as the differential impact on prices when comparing positive to 
negative sentiment periods.  
 
The result that supported this notion of a positive bias the strongest was where 
analysts on average did not change the proportion of negative recommendations 
during periods of market contraction or low business confidence when compared to 
periods where analysts were expected to be bullish. Analysts also seemed to have a 
similar preference to issue both hold and sell recommendations, and would rather 
move from buy to hold than from sell to hold. 
 
Only 13.5 per cent of analysts issued recommendations through all categories from 
strong buy through to strong sell, while the other analysts opted for differing 
recommendation patterns. The analysts therefore did not react uniformly, and 
exhibited dissimilarities in their recommendation issuance behaviour. Individual 
investors who intend on following an analyst or analysts should therefore be aware 
that analysts might react differently from each other to the same information, in line 
with the ‘differences of opinion’ theory (Harris & Raviv, 1993). Investors are 
therefore advised to study an analysts’ historic recommendations in order to be aware 
of the analyst’s preferences in order to align the investor’s trades accordingly. 
 
While previous local and international studies measured the average positive bias 
(strong buy and buy recommendations versus total number of recommendations) 
over the entire sample, this study investigated a possible positive bias per annum over 
the entire sample period, during economic growth phase periods, and over periods of 
high- and low business confidence. The annual distribution of recommendations was 
used to investigate the flow of positive versus negative recommendations as analyst 
sentiment changed during different cycles. According to the author’s knowledge, no 
other study has investigated either recommendation ‘flow’ versus overall analyst 
sentiment, or the proportional differences during different phases in the economy. 
 
The BER Business Confidence Index and the SARB Business cycle phases of South 
Africa report were used to infer periods of positive or negative sentiment among 
investors and analysts alike, and compare the impact of analysts during the two 
respective sentiment periods. The BCI produced statistically significant results for 
strong buys, buys, and strong sells that were in line with expectations, while the 
SARB demarcation yielded only weakly significant results for sell recommendations 
and strong buy RARs on day t. The BER BCI is therefore concluded to be able to 
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capture the short term growth cycles that will be ‘ignored’ by the SARB’s index. The 
BER BCI may thus contain a stronger alignment of analyst and investor sentiment, 
and can be used as a proxy for overall increased directional impact of analyst 
recommendations during periods of positive or negative sentiment. 
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